Does Morality Need God
Does Morality Depend On God?
Not in the way many people think. Many students ask this question in class and in general conversation.
Some philosophers argue that if one accepts Aristotelian essentialism, they should be open to the possibility that morality can have a foundation even in the absence of God. From an Aristotelian perspective, what is good for a human being—and how we should treat them—is determined by human nature, which exists independently of God's existence.
This is mainly correct, although I would qualify his statements in ways I will explain shortly. As I argue, it is not atheism itself that directly threatens the very possibility of morality. Instead, modern atheists typically endorse a mechanistic or anti-teleological (thus anti-Aristotelian) view of the natural world, which they misleadingly believe has been validated by modern science.
From an Aristotelian perspective, teleology or final causality is inherent to the natural order in ways that it is not for artifacts. To illustrate, a hammock made from liana vines does not inherently possess its hammock-like function; instead, that function is externally imposed by an artificer. In contrast, the vines innately exhibit their liana-like tendencies simply by being liana vines. These tendencies arise from their nature or substantial form, whereas the hammock-like tendencies do not originate from this nature; instead, they result from a merely accidental arrangement (in the technical Aristotelian sense of “accidental”). Consequently, what is good for a liana vine—what constitutes its flourishing as a living thing (taking in water and nutrients, exhibiting a specific growth pattern, etc.)—is determined by the ends that emerge from its nature or substantial form.
Natural law theory, as understood in the Aristotelian-Thomistic (A-T) tradition, presupposes an understanding of natural objects. Human beings, like all natural substances, possess a nature or substantial form, and what is good for them—what constitutes their flourishing—is determined by the ends or final causes that arise from their nature or substantial form. Just as we can generally ascertain the efficient causes of things without reference to God, we can also identify the final causes of things without invoking Him. Therefore, just as we can study physics and chemistry without appealing to God, we can study ethics without direct reference to Him, at least to a significant extent. Since we can know what is good for a thing if we understand its nature, and we can discern its nature through empirical investigation guided by sound (A-T) metaphysics, we can derive much of the natural law from the study of human nature alone. That is why it is called natural law. As Philippa Foot (2001) argues, goodness, or at least the possibility of it, is inherent in us (Natural Goodness).
From an A-T perspective, human beings, liana vines, and everything else could not exist for even a moment unless God sustains them in existence. They also could not possess causal power for an instant unless God, as the first cause, bestows that power upon them at every moment. This is precisely what A-T versions of the cosmological argument establish when properly understood (Feser, Aquinas, ch. 5). Similarly, natural phenomena could not display the teleology or final causality they do unless God constantly directs them toward their ends, which is what the Fifth Way demonstrates when properly understood (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3). However, just as A-T versions of the cosmological argument do not suggest that natural objects lack real causal power, the Fifth Way does not imply that natural objects lack inherent teleology. Using traditional metaphysical terminology, the existence of secondary causes is perfectly compatible with the A-T view that all natural causes must ultimately derive their causal power from God. A-T firmly rejects occasionalism. Likewise, the reality of immanent or “built-in” teleology, as Aristotle understood it, is fully compatible with the notion that all teleology ultimately derives from God.
The term "ultimately" is crucial here. Secondary causes are real, which allows for the possibility of natural science. When we study the physical world, we examine how physical entities behave according to their nature, rather than through the unpredictable acts of God. Similarly, the reality of immanent teleology supports the existence of natural law. In studying ethics, we analyze what is good for human beings based on their nature, rather than on arbitrary divine commands. Ultimately, the facts examined by science and ethics rely on God, as everything depends, at every moment, on Him. In that sense, science, ethics, and everything else depend on Him. However, on a practical level, ethics can often be pursued without referencing God, just as natural science can. In this context, many moral truths would still hold even if, hypothetically, God did not exist—much like the periodic table of elements would remain unchanged. This discussion is further explored in Aquinas (Feser, ch. 5) and in Cronin’s The Science of Ethics (vol. 1, ch. 8).
That said, God remains central to ethics. For one, only part of the natural law can be understood without reference to Him. Moral prohibitions against murder, lying, adultery, and dishonoring parents, for instance, can be derived from an examination of human nature alone. However, God's existence carries its own moral implications, and since it can be known through natural reason, certain religious obligations—such as the duty to love God—can be rationally understood and thus become part of natural law. Indeed, these represent the highest obligations under natural law. Furthermore, for A-T, a complete account of moral obligation requires reference to God as legislator, even if moral obligation can be explained proximately by the natural end of the will (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 91). Finally, divine revelation is essential for a full understanding of moral life, both because human intellect is too frail to reliably discern all moral truths and because certain aspects of natural law are so demanding that many people can realistically adhere to them only with the promise of a reward in the hereafter (Cronin, The Science of Ethics).
Since much of morality’s foundation and content can be understood through studying human nature alone, it follows that morality would largely remain intact even if human beings existed without God. From this perspective, morality is not based on arbitrary divine commands, just as scientific laws are not simply the result of divine whim. From an A-T standpoint, the simplistic form of divine command theory—which asserts that moral principles depend solely on divine fiat—is as problematic as occasionalism (Feser, The Last Superstition).
As I argue elsewhere, atheism itself is not a direct threat to morality. Atheists who accept Aristotelian essentialism may still affirm significant portions of natural law. Similarly, an atheistic Platonist—if such a position could be coherently maintained—might also uphold moral realism. However, a completely anti-essentialist, anti-teleological view of reality that reduces nature to mechanistic processes devoid of intrinsic purpose undermines the very possibility of objective moral values. Since modern atheism tends to embrace this radically mechanistic worldview, it is, to that extent, incompatible with morality itself.
Not in the way many people think. Many students ask this question in class and in general conversation.
Some philosophers argue that if one accepts Aristotelian essentialism, they should be open to the possibility that morality can have a foundation even in the absence of God. From an Aristotelian perspective, what is good for a human being—and how we should treat them—is determined by human nature, which exists independently of God's existence.
This is mainly correct, although I would qualify his statements in ways I will explain shortly. As I argue, it is not atheism itself that directly threatens the very possibility of morality. Instead, modern atheists typically endorse a mechanistic or anti-teleological (thus anti-Aristotelian) view of the natural world, which they misleadingly believe has been validated by modern science.
From an Aristotelian perspective, teleology or final causality is inherent to the natural order in ways that it is not for artifacts. To illustrate, a hammock made from liana vines does not inherently possess its hammock-like function; instead, that function is externally imposed by an artificer. In contrast, the vines innately exhibit their liana-like tendencies simply by being liana vines. These tendencies arise from their nature or substantial form, whereas the hammock-like tendencies do not originate from this nature; instead, they result from a merely accidental arrangement (in the technical Aristotelian sense of “accidental”). Consequently, what is good for a liana vine—what constitutes its flourishing as a living thing (taking in water and nutrients, exhibiting a specific growth pattern, etc.)—is determined by the ends that emerge from its nature or substantial form.
Natural law theory, as understood in the Aristotelian-Thomistic (A-T) tradition, presupposes an understanding of natural objects. Human beings, like all natural substances, possess a nature or substantial form, and what is good for them—what constitutes their flourishing—is determined by the ends or final causes that arise from their nature or substantial form. Just as we can generally ascertain the efficient causes of things without reference to God, we can also identify the final causes of things without invoking Him. Therefore, just as we can study physics and chemistry without appealing to God, we can study ethics without direct reference to Him, at least to a significant extent. Since we can know what is good for a thing if we understand its nature, and we can discern its nature through empirical investigation guided by sound (A-T) metaphysics, we can derive much of the natural law from the study of human nature alone. That is why it is called natural law. As Philippa Foot (2001) argues, goodness, or at least the possibility of it, is inherent in us (Natural Goodness).
From an A-T perspective, human beings, liana vines, and everything else could not exist for even a moment unless God sustains them in existence. They also could not possess causal power for an instant unless God, as the first cause, bestows that power upon them at every moment. This is precisely what A-T versions of the cosmological argument establish when properly understood (Feser, Aquinas, ch. 5). Similarly, natural phenomena could not display the teleology or final causality they do unless God constantly directs them toward their ends, which is what the Fifth Way demonstrates when properly understood (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3). However, just as A-T versions of the cosmological argument do not suggest that natural objects lack real causal power, the Fifth Way does not imply that natural objects lack inherent teleology. Using traditional metaphysical terminology, the existence of secondary causes is perfectly compatible with the A-T view that all natural causes must ultimately derive their causal power from God. A-T firmly rejects occasionalism. Likewise, the reality of immanent or “built-in” teleology, as Aristotle understood it, is fully compatible with the notion that all teleology ultimately derives from God.
The term "ultimately" is crucial here. Secondary causes are real, which allows for the possibility of natural science. When we study the physical world, we examine how physical entities behave according to their nature, rather than through the unpredictable acts of God. Similarly, the reality of immanent teleology supports the existence of natural law. In studying ethics, we analyze what is good for human beings based on their nature, rather than on arbitrary divine commands. Ultimately, the facts examined by science and ethics rely on God, as everything depends, at every moment, on Him. In that sense, science, ethics, and everything else depend on Him. However, on a practical level, ethics can often be pursued without referencing God, just as natural science can. In this context, many moral truths would still hold even if, hypothetically, God did not exist—much like the periodic table of elements would remain unchanged. This discussion is further explored in Aquinas (Feser, ch. 5) and in Cronin’s The Science of Ethics (vol. 1, ch. 8).
That said, God remains central to ethics. For one, only part of the natural law can be understood without reference to Him. Moral prohibitions against murder, lying, adultery, and dishonoring parents, for instance, can be derived from an examination of human nature alone. However, God's existence carries its own moral implications, and since it can be known through natural reason, certain religious obligations—such as the duty to love God—can be rationally understood and thus become part of natural law. Indeed, these represent the highest obligations under natural law. Furthermore, for A-T, a complete account of moral obligation requires reference to God as legislator, even if moral obligation can be explained proximately by the natural end of the will (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 91). Finally, divine revelation is essential for a full understanding of moral life, both because human intellect is too frail to reliably discern all moral truths and because certain aspects of natural law are so demanding that many people can realistically adhere to them only with the promise of a reward in the hereafter (Cronin, The Science of Ethics).
Since much of morality’s foundation and content can be understood through studying human nature alone, it follows that morality would largely remain intact even if human beings existed without God. From this perspective, morality is not based on arbitrary divine commands, just as scientific laws are not simply the result of divine whim. From an A-T standpoint, the simplistic form of divine command theory—which asserts that moral principles depend solely on divine fiat—is as problematic as occasionalism (Feser, The Last Superstition).
As I argue elsewhere, atheism itself is not a direct threat to morality. Atheists who accept Aristotelian essentialism may still affirm significant portions of natural law. Similarly, an atheistic Platonist—if such a position could be coherently maintained—might also uphold moral realism. However, a completely anti-essentialist, anti-teleological view of reality that reduces nature to mechanistic processes devoid of intrinsic purpose undermines the very possibility of objective moral values. Since modern atheism tends to embrace this radically mechanistic worldview, it is, to that extent, incompatible with morality itself.
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